A new approach to manipulation arguments by Patrick Todd
A new approach to manipulation arguments
Patrick Todd
Published online: 23 October 2009
 The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that
moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such
strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral
responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipula-
tion. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments
against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical
burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated
agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly)
not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make
do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in
question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on
whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked
the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to
unveil their real power.
Keywords Free will  Moral responsibility  Manipulation  Derk Pereboom 
Compatibilism  Incompatibilism
1 Introduction
There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral
responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such
strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral
responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining
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manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation
arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy
dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which
manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but
are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that
incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim
that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility.
The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible
has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against
compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power.
I present my case by investigating what is (so far) the most sophisticated
manipulation argument against compatibilism: Derk Pereboom’s widely influential
‘‘Four Case’’ argument. There is much to be appreciated in this argument. However,
as I hope to show, it merely contains the seeds of a more powerful one.
2 Modifying the four case argument
Consider ‘‘Case 2’’ (perhaps the central case) of Pereboom’s ‘‘Four Case’’ argument
for incompatibilism:
Plum is like an ordinary human being, except that a team of neuroscientists
has programmed him at the beginning of his life to weigh reasons for action so
that he is often but not exclusively rationally egoistic, with the consequence
that in the circumstance in which he now finds himself, he is causally
determined to undertake the reasons-responsive process of deliberation and to
possess the set of first- and second-order desires that result in his killing
White. Plum does have the general ability to regulate his behavior by moral
reasons, but in his circumstances the egoistic reasons weigh heavily for him,
and as a result he is causally determined to murder White. Nevertheless, he
does not act because of an irresistible desire1 (Fischer et al. 2007, p. 75).
Is Plum morally responsible (in the sense that he deserves blame) for killing
White? Pereboom says ‘no’. However, and this is the central point, the case is
designed so that Plum fully meets all compatibilist conditions for moral responsi-
bility. The upshot, then, is that compatibilist conditions for responsibility are too
1 Case 2 has been interpreted in various different ways, some ways being ‘stronger’ than others. In
particular, Mele (2005) reads the case in such a way that Plum is importantly different with respect to
control than ‘typical’ agents. However, as I read the case (and as I will understand it in this paper), it is no
different than what Mele has called an ‘original design’ scenario. Mele considers the case of a goddess
Diana who creates a zygote in an environment such that, with the laws of nature, it is determined that the
resulting person (Ernie) will do X after 30 years (2006, p. 188). In other words, Ernie is like everyone
else, except that the details of his life were the result of the intentional activity of Diana. Mele considers
this case to be severely problematic for the compatibilist. I regard Case 2 and Mele’s ‘Zygote Argument’
scenario to be on a par. The neuroscientists simply ‘set up’ Plum in such a way that he is determined to




weak: one can meet such conditions, as Plum did, yet nevertheless be subject to the
responsibility-undermining manipulation of the neuroscientists.
Of course, one possible compatibilist reply to this case would have it that there is
some principled distinction between one’s acts being determined by the neurosci-
entists and one’s acts being determined by mere natural causes. And, so this strategy
says, all the compatibilist is committed to is the thesis that moral responsibility is
compatible with mere causal determinism, not that it is compatible with
determinism by manipulators. Thus, there must be some (or we must provide
some) further compatibilist condition for responsibility that is in fact violated in
Case 2, but which would not be violated if mere determinism holds.
But Pereboom argues (convincingly, I think) that there is no relevant difference
between Case 2 and mere causal determinism. Pereboom compares Case 2 to
another case, Case 4, where Case 4 is simply Case 2 over again, except that natural
deterministic causes have taken the place of the neuroscientists. By comparing such
cases, Pereboom says, we can see that it is in fact irrelevant that Plum’s act was
deterministically brought about by such manipulators; whether Plum’s psycholog-
ical states ultimately trace back to intentional agents or non-intentional causes
should not matter. We can thus generalize from Plum’s lack of responsibility in
Case 2 to Plum’s lack of responsibility in Case 4. Moreover, it is worth noticing that
leading compatibilists have in fact agreed that there is no principled distinction
between one’s acts being determined by the neuroscientists and by mere natural
causes. Hence, the rest of this paper will simply take for granted the thesis that there
is no relevant difference vis-a`-vis blameworthiness between Case 2 and Case 4. Of
course, compatibilists are free to try to articulate such a difference. Here I simply
note that those taking such a line face a difficult challenge, and that I do not believe
this strategy is promising.
Now, notice: Pereboom’s argument asks the reader to concur in the judgment that
the victim of Case 2-style manipulation is simply not responsible—not at all. To
begin to see how Pereboom’s argument can be modified, I suggest that we re-
imagine the case along the following lines. Suppose one is an eye-witness to
White’s horrific murder, but one does not yet know anything about the role of the
neuroscientists. The murder seems to be (in the relevant respects) ‘typical’—one
can see that Plum was not coerced into performing the act, not acting on any
compulsive desire, that he murdered White for selfish reasons, knew what he was
doing, and so on. Now, we imagine that the following question is put to one:
Q1 On a scale from 1 to 10, rate how much blame Plum deserves for killing
White, where 0 is no blame at all, and 10 is the most blameworthy you can imagine
someone being.
Now, one writes down one’s answer to this question. Of course, the question
could be different in some respects; the question could ask, for instance, how many
years in prison (or some such) Plum deserves (on non-consequentialist grounds) for
his act. The important point here is that one writes down one’s judgment about Plum
before one finds out about the neuroscientists.
So we now imagine that the broader picture is unveiled: one sees how the
neuroscientists programmed Plum in such a way as to make his killing White
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causally determined. Now, manipulation arguments so far have (implicitly) gone on
to ask the question (and solely the question):
Q2 Having now found out about the role the neuroscientists played in
programming Plum, do you still think Plum deserves blame for killing White?
The incompatibilist response to Q2 is of course to say: no. The incompatibilist
thinks that, having found out about the neuroscientists, one should no longer think
that Plum deserves blame for killing White. As the incompatibilist sees things, after
having found out about the neuroscientists, one should judge that if anyone deserves
blame for Plum’s killing White, it is the neuroscientists and not Plum.
Now, the compatibilist answer to Q2 is of course to say: yes. That is, the
compatibilist maintains that despite having found out about the neuroscientists, it is
still appropriate to judge that Plum deserves blame for his act. The central dispute
concerning manipulation arguments has thus far simply been whether a yes or no
response to Q2 is the appropriate one. As I’ll now argue, sole focus on this question
is a mistake.
To begin to see why focusing solely on a yes/no response to Q2 is a mistake,
recall the question originally put in Q1:
Q1 On a scale from 1 to 10, rate how much blame Plum deserves for killing
White, where 0 is no blame at all, and 10 is the most blameworthy you can imagine
someone being.
Again, the compatibilist believes that, even being aware of the role of the
neuroscientists, it remains appropriate to think Plum is blameworthy, or to think Plum
still deserves punishment, and so on. But, of course, this position is consistent with
radically revising one’s initial judgment of blameworthiness after gaining full
information. That is, one could answer yes to Q2, but with the following qualification:
‘‘I initially rated the amount of blame Plum deserves as a 7 out of 10. Now, I still feel
that he deserves blame, but with full information, I think he deserves only a 4 out of
10, rather than a 7 out of 10. I don’t feel nearly as badly towards him.’’
In other words, while the incompatibilist straightaway judges that any ‘7’ she
might have initially felt towards Plum should now be reduced to a ‘0’, others may
not go all the way here—they may hold that while the manipulation in question
diminishes Plum’s blameworthiness, it does not eliminate it. But what would such a
judgment mean for compatibilism? Seemingly, it would mean that the truth of
determinism implies diminished or mitigated blameworthiness. Recall: there is (very
plausibly) no important difference between Plum’s acts being brought about by the
neuroscientists and by merely natural but deterministic causes. So if one judges that
the role of the neuroscientists in Plum’s life (setting him up the way he is, etc.)
implies lessened blameworthiness, one should likewise judge that the role of
impersonal deterministic causes implies lessened blameworthiness.
So, unless she admits that determinism implies mitigated blame, the compatibilist
is in fact committed to something much stronger than a mere ‘yes’ to Q2; she is
committed to the claim that finding out about the role of the neuroscientists should
make no difference to one’s feelings of moral disgust towards Plum. The
compatibilist seemingly must endorse what we might call the
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No Difference Thesis: Case 2-style manipulation should make no difference to
one’s judgment of how much blame Plum deserves for killing White.
As the incompatibilist sees things, it is hard enough to maintain that Plum deserves
blame, but things are apparently even harder: if the compatibilist is to be believed, not
even a revision of judgment is appropriate, given knowledge of Plum’s background. I
(along with other incompatibilists) submit that this is an excessively strong claim.
Now, perhaps some compatibilists are prepared to agree with me that the No
Difference Thesis is excessively strong. That is, perhaps some compatibilists have
looked into their (heretofore hardened) philosophical hearts and seen that they
would (or should) feel less inclined to harshly judge (or punish) Plum, given the
lousy lot he received at the hands of the neuroscientists. I welcome the softness of
these hearts. But, they argue, all compatibilism qua compatibilism is committed to
is, well, the thesis that blameworthiness is compatible with determinism, not that the
truth of determinism is simply irrelevant to blameworthiness. Hence, they maintain,
compatibilism remains undefeated, despite an admission of lessened blameworthi-
ness if determinism is true. If the compatibilist takes this line, a new challenge
presents itself.
Here is the new challenge. Again, the compatibilist in question is someone who
admits that the truth of determinism implies mitigated blameworthiness. But if the
compatibilist admits that determinism itself is mitigating, a fair question is, In virtue
of what? What is it about determinism’s obtaining that makes revised judgments of
blameworthiness appropriate? Here the compatibilist is on thin ice, for she must
specify features of determinism that only mitigate responsibility rather than ruling it
out. Now, what could such features be? I submit that I cannot see what the
compatibilist could offer here. For instance, the compatibilist may say: determinism
mitigates responsibility because its truth would entail that the characters from which
our choices flow are partially the result of factors beyond our control. This is right,
of course, but it is of course also right that if determinism is true, the characters from
which our choices flow are entirely the result of factors beyond our control—there is
apparently no room for degrees here. And if the fact that our characters are partially
the result of such factors is sufficient to diminish responsibility, surely the fact that
they are entirely the result of such factors is sufficient to eliminate it.
Or perhaps the compatibilist says: the truth of determinism implies mitigated
blameworthiness because determinism rules out alternative possibilities. (Notice: no
one could plausibly maintain that determinism merely rules out some alternatives.)
But surely this is awkward. Presumably, if alternative possibilities have any role to
play in moral responsibility, it is that they are necessary for it, not just that they are
an inessential ‘add-on’ which merely deepens or increases moral responsibility, and
without which it remains (basically) intact.2 At any rate, any view on which
2 Indeed, those who accept that the upshot of so-called ‘Frankfurt-style cases’ is that alternative
possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility typically think that these examples show that
alternatives are irrelevant or useless. That is, if the examples work as supposed, they appear to show that
nothing important depends on alternatives, since (apparently) everything important to agency is
nevertheless retained by Jones (the monitored agent that, due to the presence of the counterfactual
intervener, has no alternatives). Jones is no less blameworthy, despite the fact that he could not do
otherwise.
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alternative possibilities play this sort of role would need to be articulated and
defended.
So, we are left wondering: according to the compatibilist that rejects the No
Difference Thesis, why does determinism mitigate the amount of blame our bad
actions call for, or the amount of punishment they deserve? I do not see any obvious
compatibilist reply to this question. Of course, I do not claim to have proven that
compatibilists cannot consistently reject the No Difference Thesis, but minimally I
believe the dialectical burden would be on the compatibilist to articulate a plausible
picture of what such a rejection would look like. In the absence of such a picture,
any compatibilist rejection of the No Difference Thesis must appear strained.3
I believe we are now in position to briefly state how a manipulation argument
with the new approach I favor may be articulated. We may call this argument the
Modified Manipulation Argument (here on the MMA):
(1) If blameworthiness is mitigated for Plum in Case 2, blameworthiness is
mitigated if mere causal determinism is true.
(2) If blameworthiness is mitigated if mere causal determinism is true, then
compatibilism is false.
(3) Blameworthiness is mitigated for Plum in Case 2.
So, (4) Compatibilism is false.
Now, I have just been defending (2)—the claim that compatibilists cannot
plausibly maintain that determinism merely mitigates blameworthiness. Further, I
believe (1) to be relatively uncontroversial. And here, with other incompatibilists, I
simply assert my considered judgment that (3) is true: Plum’s is a case of mitigated
blame. Given the premises, the conclusion that compatibilism is false follows.
But perhaps the compatibilist will disagree with my considered judgment about
Case 2, despite its being weaker than a judgment that Plum is simply not
blameworthy. That is, one might think that the best compatibilist reply to the MMA
is not to reject (2), but to stick to one’s guns, and maintain that one’s initial reaction
to Plum should not weaken after becoming aware of the neuroscientists. Once it is
understood, compatibilists may say, that Plum is not subject to compulsive desires,
is fully able to regulate his behavior by moral reasons, is fully reasons-responsive,
and so on, we will have no reason to weaken our negative attitudes towards him.
Thus, one denies (3) and maintains the No Difference Thesis: Case 2 style
manipulation is not mitigating for Plum.
But here it is worth drawing some conclusions. If denying (3) is the best
compatibilist response to the MMA, then incompatibilists wielding manipulation
arguments have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. All
incompatibilists should be (or must be) claiming is that Case 2-style manipulation
(or its equivalent) dampens or detracts from Plum’s blameworthiness: a judgment of
3 While I am skeptical that a plausible compatibilist rejection of the No Difference Thesis will be
forthcoming, we ought to see that such a rejection would still be a significant admission on the part of
compatibilists. For, in reading most compatibilist literature, one does not get the sense that compatibilists
believe that the truth of determinism in any way threatens the correctness or the appropriateness of our
judgments about moral desert. A rejection of the No Difference Thesis would be an admission that this
position has been wrong: determinism is relevant.
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‘7’ should at least decrease to a ‘6’, and so on, not that a 7 should decrease to a zero.
This burden is significantly lighter than the one incompatibilists have so far been
carrying, and the burden is to that extent significantly heavier for compatibilists. Is it
really plausible to think that the fact that Plum got such a raw deal at the hands of
the neuroscientists is simply irrelevant to Plum’s moral desert? I do not think so, but
such a result appears to be the (increased) cost of compatibilism.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that traditional manipulation arguments against
compatibilism can be modified so as to be much stronger than heretofore supposed.
Incompatibilists need only the judgment that the relevant kind of manipulation
(whether it be Case 2-style or otherwise) mitigates blameworthiness. If such
arguments—as is widely held—already have shown that compatibilists must take a
hard line, I hope to have shown that this line is yet harder still.4
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